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Review: Is Hedge Fund Registration
Necessary?
J.W. Verret∗
In Is Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Necessary To
Accomplish the Goals of the Dodd–Frank Act’s Title IV?,1 Luke
Ashworth sets out a formidable case that questions the grounds
for the mandatory hedge fund registration requirement contained
in the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (Dodd–Frank Act).2 This review of his Note will offer a
description of the piece’s key strengths, suggest some challenges
to the solutions it offers, and close with suggestions about areas
that might build on Ashworth’s work in future scholarship.
I. Review
A. The Argument
Ashworth lays out a well-researched background of the
history of the hedge fund industry, prior attempts to regulate the
industry, and the complex regulatory regime that previously
exempted the industry from mandatory registration which was
amended by the Dodd–Frank Act.
He explores the underlying justification for the mandatory
registration rule by describing hedge fund crises at Long-Term
Capital Management in 1999 and two Bear Stearns hedge funds
during 2007. He notes how the drafters of the hedge fund
registration rule were motivated by a desire to prevent investor
fraud and to minimize and monitor systemic risk.
∗ Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.
1. Luther R. Ashworth II, Is Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Necessary
to Accomplish the Goals of the Dodd–Frank Act’s Title IV?, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 651 (2013).
2. Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
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Ashworth’s skepticism of the mandatory registration
requirement as a response to the financial crisis is even stronger
than he suggests. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s
(FCIC) Final Report on the Causes of the Financial and Economic
Crisis in the United States mentions hedge funds quite
infrequently, and even when it does so it does not describe their
involvement in any way that would support the mandatory
registration provision.3 While hedge funds were active
participants in markets for asset-backed securities that quickly
lost value in the financial crisis,4 it is unclear that they were
more aggressive than other investors. Indeed, many hedge funds
also took short positions in real estate-derived assets, and
companies invested in them, that can be credited with popping
the asset bubble before it grew even bigger.5
It is also unclear how registration would have affected those
funds that played a role in the asset bubble. For example, the
FCIC Report examines the role of “hedge funds” at Bear Stearns
that had significant positions in mortgage-backed securities,
which ultimately brought down the investment bank in 2007 and
eventually led to the government-facilitated takeover of the bank
by JP Morgan in 2008.6 But Bear Stearns was not an unregulated
entity—in fact it was much more heavily regulated under the
Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Consolidated
Supervised Entity (CSE) capital regulation program than the
investment adviser registration regime that hedge funds will be
subject to post-Dodd–Frank.7
3. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE
UNITED STATES, at xi (2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT], http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys
/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (reporting “to the President, the Congress,
and the American people the results of [the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission’s] examinations and conclusions as to the causes of the crisis”).
4. See, e.g., id. at 136 (noting that hedge funds often invested in assetbacked securities, such as mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt
obligations).
5. See, e.g., Lauren Schuker Blum, John Paulson Double Down, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 19, 2012, at M3 (“Hedge-fund manager John Paulson famously made
nearly $4 billion in 2007 correctly betting that the housing bubble, fueled by the
subprime mortgage market, would pop.”).
6. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at xxi.
7. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC’S
OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED
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Ashworth accepts that large hedge funds had a prominent
role in the financial crisis but argues that the registration
requirement is overbroad from an alternative perspective.
Ashworth effectively demonstrates that the redundancy created
by Dodd–Frank, in which both the Office of Financial Research
(OFR) under the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)
and the SEC will serve as information coordinators, will not aid
systemic risk oversight and may cause its own problems. The
reader is left convinced that information-reporting requirements,
for the same purpose but from different regulators, will
compound compliance costs and may even create mutually
inconsistent reporting requirements.
If systemic risk is the issue, it is unclear whether and to
what extent creating multiple information-collection entities, in
both the SEC and the OFR at the Treasury Department, will
provide additional value. Where the OFR will be able to
coordinate with the FSOC, charged with systemic risk
determinations, the SEC will be a step removed from the central
decision-making and will have to coordinate through multiple
layers to obtain useful information. Redundancies in this area
will not be costless, but will add multiple layers of compliance
requirements and multiply the risk that proprietary trading
information will be revealed to market competitors.
Ashworth’s argument would have been edified by considering
the SEC’s failure to respond appropriately to tips it received and
preliminary inquiries it initiated in the Madoff and Stanford
cases, both generally recognized as exceptional failures by the
agency to catch multi-billion dollar Ponzi schemes despite the
hedge funds being voluntarily registered with the SEC, and
despite the Madoff broker-dealer subsidiary having received
successful compliance audits from the SEC prior to the frauds
SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM, at v (2008), http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/
AuditsInspections/ 2008/446-a.pdf (“The [CSE] program is a voluntary program
that was created in 2004 by the [SEC] . . . . This program allows the [SEC] to
supervise [certain] broker-dealer holding companies on a consolidated basis.”).
Thus, the CSE program allowed the SEC to supervise Bear Stearns prior to the
financial crisis in a manner that “extend[ed] beyond the registered broker-dealer
to the unregulated affiliates of the broker-dealer to the holding company itself.”
Id. After the collapse of Bear Stearns, the SEC stated that even with increased
oversight, “[I]t is undisputable that the CSE program failed to carry out its
mission in its oversight of Bear Stearns . . . .” Id. at viii.
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being revealed.8 Even worse, after examining the Stanford funds,
the SEC compliance staff suggested to the SEC enforcement staff
that it was probably a Ponzi scheme, whereupon the SEC
enforcement staff nevertheless decided against taking action.9
Though the legislative history of Dodd–Frank references both
objectives of fraud prevention and systemic risk oversight,10 it
remains unclear whether the mandatory registration
requirement was more predominantly an investor protection
measure or a systemic risk measure. If the latter, a critique of the
SEC’s response to the Madoff and Stanford cases remains
relevant.
B. Review of Ashworth’s Recommendations
While the Note offers skepticism of the ability of the SEC to
monitor systemic risk, it accepts the general notion that large
financial players implicate systemic concerns. It is important to
note that during the financial crisis, many hedge funds made bets
against the real estate bubble, in effect correcting a wayward
market.11 Hedge funds have enjoyed a level of investment
flexibility and freedom from regulatory rigidity that has
historically led them to take a commanding role in short selling,
which helps to foster a vibrant price discovery function and

8. See Lori A. Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections &
Examinations, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Testimony Concerning Examinations by
the Securities and Exchange Commission and Issues Raised by the Bernard L.
Madoff Investment Securities Matter (Jan. 27, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts112709lar.htm (“Examinations of the
Madoff broker-dealer firm did not find the alleged fraud committed by Mr.
Madoff, and the [SEC’s] staff did not examine his advisory opinions, which first
became registered with the [SEC] in late 2006.”).
9. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTIGATION OF THE SEC’S RESPONSE TO
CONCERNS REGARDING ROBERT ALLEN STANFORD’S ALLEGED PONZI SCHEME 16
(2010),
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/oig-526.pdf
(providing
an
executive summary of the SEC’s role in the Stanford Ponzi scheme).
10. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-57, at 866 (2010), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CRPT-111hrpt517/pdf/CRPT-111hrpt517.pdf (stating that Title IV of the Dodd–
Frank Act “expands the advisers’ reporting requirements to the SEC as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of
investors or for the assessment of risk by the FSOC”).
11. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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provides liquidity to the market.12 Therefore, Ashworth’s
suggestion for a compromise approach focusing on systemic risk
oversight of larger firms must nevertheless take into account the
possibility that his compromise approach may also inhibit those
functions served by the hedge fund industry.
Ashworth accepts the popular argument that size is the key
dimension of systemic risk, relying on work seeking to give
preliminary definition to systemic risk by Schwarcz.13 But it
should also be noted that another important vein of scholarship
discounts the role of size in systemic risk.14
As Ashworth notes, the SEC has left jurisdiction over hedge
fund registration for firms with assets under management
between $25 million and $100 million to states. The compromise
he suggests would be complicated by the SEC’s current allocation
of authority between the states and the federal government.
Small firms would be registered with states, medium-sized firms
would be unregistered, and larger firms would be regulated by
the FSOC. This donut hole of unregulated companies may create
some potentially costly unintended consequences.
The existence of even light-touch regulation pursuant to the
Investment Advisers Act of 194015 or the FSOC may serve merely
as a prelude to subsequent enhanced regulation. A few high
profile problems in the hedge fund sector could mean the SEC or
the FSOC, or the Federal Reserve as regulator of designated
systemically significant financial institutions, will feel pressure
to enhance its regulatory authority in this area from the existing
investment adviser oversight to a new regime mirroring the
investment company or publicly-traded company model, in which
disclosure methodologies become mandatory, the ability of
investment managers to communicate with investors and
12. See J.W. Verret, Dr. Jones and the Raiders of Lost Capital: Hedge Fund
Regulation, Part II, A Self-Regulation Proposal, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 799, 815
(2007) (explaining vital roles hedge funds play in the U.S. economy).
13. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204
(2008).
14. See Chen Zhou, Are Banks Too Big to Fail? Measuring Systemic
Importance of Financial Institutions, 6 INT’L J. CENT. BANKING 205, 205 (2010)
(“Both the theoretical model and empirical analysis reveal that, when analyzing
the systemic risk posed by one financial institution to the system, size should
not be considered as a proxy of systemic importance.”).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2010).
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potential investors will be limited to regulatory approved forms,
and the investment strategies will be directly or indirectly
regulated by the SEC. If that occurs, it would seriously damage
the liquidity and price discovery functions the hedge fund
industry serves.
II. Groundwork for Future Inquiry
There are two readily apparent avenues for further research
that might build on Ashworth’s successful Note in future work.
The newly passed Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS
Act)16 includes a lift on the general solicitation ban found in
Regulation D, one which hedge funds frequently use in soliciting
investments.17 Further, the fact that the hedge fund industry
itself embraced the mandatory registration regime, or at least did
not fight against it, presents a puzzle for which public choice
theory may provide an answer.
Henry Manne’s work in the public choice dynamics of
securities regulation suggests that one motivating force behind
the development of the securities laws is that large incumbent
firms seek to stifle competition from newer, upstart entrants to
markets by supporting regulations that increase the costs of
entry into markets.18 If any participants in the hedge fund
industry supported the mandatory registration rule, this could
explain why.
Another suggestion for further inquiry would be to consider
how changes found in the JOBS Act will change Luke’s
argument. Among the provisions of the JOBS Act is a
requirement that the SEC lift the ban against general
solicitations under Regulation D.19 This is an exemption
frequently used by hedge funds. What does lifting the general
16. Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the U.S.C.)
17. See generally Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation
and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act
Release No. 33-9354 (Aug. 29, 2012).
18. See generally HENRY G. MANNE ET AL., WALL STREET IN TRANSITION: THE
EMERGING SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY (1974).
19. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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solicitation ban do to his investor sophistication argument? Will
the fact that hedge funds will be able to communicate with
potential investors more broadly significantly alter the cost–
benefit calculus behind the mandatory registration rule? Or will
the fact that hedge funds will still be limited to investments by
accredited investors minimize the impact of the JOBS Act on this
discussion?
III. Conclusion
Ashworth’s work is provocative and insightful, and offers a
unique willingness to question the conventional wisdom behind a
popular item in the Dodd–Frank Act. It opens the door for future
inquiry into this new avenue of securities regulation and suggests
exciting opportunities for thinking about the SEC’s hedge fund
regulatory regime with veins of thought in the securities
regulatory, finance, and public choice scholarship.

